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Abstract
Ransomware infections have grown exponentially during the recent past to cause major
disruption in operations across a range of industries including the government. Through
this research, we present an analysis of 14 strains of ransomware that infect Windows
platforms, and we do a comparison of Windows Application Programming Interface
(API) calls made through ransomware processes with baselines of normal operating
system behavior. The study identifies and reports salient features of ransomware as
referred through the frequencies of API calls.
Keywords: Cryptovirology, cybersecurity, intrusion detection, malware, ransomware,
Win/32

1. Introduction
Malware or malicious software is defined as any program or process that is crafted by
the adversary to either affect routine operations of a computer, its operating system and
hosted software, or to steal sensitive data. When such malware is crafted with the intent
of extorting user data and holding it for ransom, then it is categorized as ransomware.
While malware has been persistent for decades, the emergence of ransomware as the
next big threat adopts a new business model by threat actors. The evolution of malware
capabilities over the past 30 years is attributed to the rapid advances in computing
power, memory, and communication bandwidth. Extortion of user data through
malware dates back to 1989, when the PC CYBORG (AIDS) Trojan was released on
floppy disks. Infected floppy disks when inserted by naïve users into their workstations
would cause a Trojan infection, locking user files using basic cryptographic techniques,
presenting a message stating the user’s ‘breach of software license’, and demanding an
amount of approximately US $200 for release of the extorted data. The Trojan was not
very successful because the payment procedure adopted by the adversary was through
bank cheques and the proliferation of malware through the crude floppy-disk medium
was excruciatingly slow.
Strong data encryption techniques, attributed to advances in computing power and
memory technology/affordability, alongside advances in payment techniques and
cryptocurrency [1] have led to rapid evolution of ransomware during the period 20071
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2016. The ability of the adversary to conceal his/her identity and reaps profit through
ransomware infections proliferating across billions of Internet-connected devices, is
thus easily achievable in today’s highly connected landscape. CTB-Locker (Curve,
TOR, Bitcoin), is considered to be the first variant of ransomware to effectively
combine three key characteristics required to achieve a high degree of success in
infection, namely, the anonymity capabilities of the TOR routing protocol to conceal
adversary location, the anonymous payment capabilities of Bitcoin to keep payment
path untraceable, and strong encryption based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography with
sufficient key lengths to resist attempts to crack the key including those involving bruteforce [2].
In 2013, a 500% growth in ransomware variants and capabilities was reported [2]. This
can be attributed to the three technological advances enumerated above. The common
families of ransomware alongside their respective dates of emergence are listed as
follows [2]: PC CYBORG Trojan (12/19/1989), One Half Virus (>1994), GPCode
family (~2004), Reveton (~2012), CryptoLocker (~2013), CryptoWall (~2014),
CryptoDefense (~2014), PoshCoder (~2014), Virlock (~2014), TeslaCrypt (~2015),
CryptoFortress (~2015), CryptoTorLocker2015 (~2015), CTB-Locker (~2015),
CryptoWall (~2016), Xorist (~2016), Filecoder (~2017) along with variants such as
Petya (~2017), JAFF (~2017), and Wannacrypt (~2017).
Ransomware evolution witnessed the first brief increase in 2006-07 [3], mainly through
the emergence of the GPCode variants. The GPCode.ak variant in particular was known
to write the encrypted file contents to a new location in the user’s disk, deleting the
unencrypted user files. Through application of the ‘undeletion utility’, partial recovery
of user data was possible without having to pay the ransom to the adversary. Newer
variants of GPCode used stronger encryption techniques with longer encryption keys
(1024 or 2048 bits), thus encumbering the user data recovery attempts at the victim’s
machine.
A close look at the evolution of several versions of ransomware releases revealed that
they were mostly copy-paste code from previous versions. Therefore, many of the
limitations of one version were carried over to the next. In addition, several ransomware
variants operated in unconventional ways. For instance, the Reveton ransomware [2],
released in 2015, was found to merely lock the operation system’s boot process without
encrypting user data. Consequently, the ransomware activity was limited to disruption
of operations and recovering user data without having to pay the ransom amount, was
found to be easily achievable.
Another observed characteristic of recent ransomware traits is the ransomware
procedural requirement to contact a centralized Command-and-Control (C2C) Server,
once the victims’ machine is infected, prior to encrypting the data. The C2C Server
typically holds the cryptographic key required to decrypt the victim’s data which has
been held for ransom. In summary, the four stages of a ransomware-based attack can
be described as follows:
 Infection: The ransomware software infects a victim’s machine when the naïve
victim opens an attachment that accompanies a spam message. Alternately, the
victim’s machine can also be infected when a compromised website is accessed.
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Data encryption: Once the victim’s machine is infected with ransomware,
cryptographic keys utilizing the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are generated
either on the infected PC or the C2C server. The ransomware then proceeds to
lock down the user’s files or device. Ransomware specific definitions
commonly result in one of two actions being undertaken: either the data/files on
the victim’s machine are attacked on a file-by-file basis, or critical filesystem
structures such as the Windows Master File Table are altered. In both cases, the
original files or data are encrypted with the host specific cryptographic keys,
and the original files or metadata are then deleted.
Demand: The ransomware software displays a message to the victim demanding
that a certain amount be paid so as to release the locked data/files.
Outcome: Based on the action taken by the victim, the following are possible
outcomes: a) the data is recovered through elimination of ransomware trait from
the victim’s machine without paying the ransom amount, b) payments are made
through anonymous channels such as BitCoin/MoneyPak or DarkCoin, or c)
payments are not made and the ransomware trait is not eliminated, upon which
the data/files are destroyed; with no backup in place, permanent loss of victim’s
data/files thus occurs.

It can be seen from the above examples that ransomware activity must by nature follow
specific patterns of behavior. These patterns include the file identification process,
encryption of files, network command and control communications, and use of
anonymous networks. Quite simply, there is no optimal way to scan files and encrypt
their content without making system level calls facilitated through the Windows
Application Programming Interface (API). The Window API [4] provides a set of
programming interfaces that simplify the process of developing software. For example,
while a developer makes the system call “FileOpen”, the operating system executes a
series of instructions to locate the file in the file system, checks file access rights and
permissions, and locates the file on the hard disk before returning the handle or
reference back to the developer. By using the Windows API, developers are free to
focus on the logic of their program (or malware) code and use the pre-defined
procedures to accomplish their tasks [5].
Windows API sequence of calls has been an area of research during the recent past. In
[6], the authors have presented a ransomware detection scheme that operates on
Windows platforms and identifies modifications to various application types. Thirty
most common Windows applications were evaluated and attempts by ransomware to
access these file types, were analysed and reported.
. In [7], the authors present a call tracer approach for identifying the sequence of
Windows API sequence of calls, by comparing the patterns of calls with known
databases of malware, and by applying machine learning techniques for data analysis.
Malware samples obtained from popular repositories were analysed and the results of
the machine learning based classification of these samples were reported. In [8], the
authors proposed an approach for identifying API sequence calls for malware samples.
The lack of accuracy in anti-virus tools was highlighted as one of the motivations for
the research conducted. Malware behaviour was generalised across 23,080 popular
samples of malware.
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As the number of Windows API calls is limited, and generally lower level file, network
and cryptographic operations are exposed through a limited set of instructions, it may
be possible to detect ransomware specific activities by analyzing their usage (or calls)
to certain Windows API functions. We analyse and report ransomware activity based
on the executing payload that has been transferred to a victim’s machine beforehand.
API call patterns and frequency analysis are used to help determine the behaviour of
ransomware in a real-world environment. By identifying the programming patterns
used by ransomware programmers, we can improve Operating System or Kernel level
protection mechanisms. TBased on the results reported in this paper, we provide a
fundamental platform for researchers to examine methods of ransomware detection
based on behavioural analysis and/or entropy-based analysis, for future research.

2. Method, experimental setup, data processing and analysis
2.1 Method
We selected ransomware strains from recently circulated and well publicised
ransomware variants [9][10][11] from various online resources. Ransomware strains
were analysed based on their individual behaviour patterns. We tested ransomware and
normal (non-malicious) baseline operations in successive experiments on a
standardized Virtual Machine (VM). For each experimental test, we reset the VM to
the same initial configuration, loaded a target test case, started the VM, logged Process
Monitor events for a fixed duration of 10 minutes, and then halted the machine, and
finally we exported the logged data and saved it for analysis. All ransomware tests were
fully automated with the experimental tests execution and data collection scripted
through a combination of BASH scripts, batch files and PowerShell scripts to ensure
uniformity over each experimental test. For some baseline experimental tests the
automated scripts were modified or customized for specific (often interactive)
operations such as software installation and simulated web browsing.

2.2 Experimental setup
We created a 32-bit Windows 8 Virtual Machine in a Virtual Box. This Test VM was
provided with a firewalled Internet connection through an intermediate VPN router and
firewall. We preloaded the virtual disk image with a mix of documents, picture and
video files. We saved them to multiple locations on the disk image. A Virtual Box
shared folder was mapped to a drive letter and loaded with a multilevel directory
structure, documents and media files. The virtual disk image and the shared folder were
reset to initial conditions for each experimental test conducted. Table 1 presents the
user file structure of the virtual machine deployed. The total disk space was 25 GB with
13.5 GB used space. Table 2 shows the count of the numbers of files in the shared
network folder. Image files were the most popular file types whereas PDF files were
found to be the least frequent.
Location

File count and size

Desktop

1.07GB, 442 files, 90 folders

Documents

524MB, 66 files, 22 folders

4

Pictures

417MB, 1344 files, 9 folders

Videos

661MB, 16 Files, 0 Folders

Table 1 - Virtual machine victim user's file structure

File type
jpg and png image files

Count of files in shared (network)
folder
1337

ppt (and pptx)

2

pdf

55

doc (and docx)

34

xls (and xlsx)

17

mp3/mp4 (audio and video media)

20

other filetypes

27

directory and subdirectory entries (maxdepth = 5)

31

Table 2 - Shared folders (network) file counts

Automation
element/method
Create PowerShell
experiment execution
control file

Automated on Host or Guest

Description

Host

VirtualBox automation

Host

PowerShell scripts

Guest

Shared filesystem reset

Host

Timed hard shutdown

Host

Data extraction

Guest and Host

Create a control file for use by
Windows PowerShell on boot up –
specifies the experiment to run,
working directory and various
other conditions
Use of BASH script and VirtualBox
Manage commands to start/stop
and reset VM snapshots
Read the control file from a shared
read-only resource to identify
experiment’s executable and run
conditions
BASH script to reset shared
filesystem resources
Hard shutdown of the guest VM
and restart into data extraction
mode
Restart and launch ProcMon to
recover boot time data. Save files
and then move extracted files to a
safe location for future analysis

Table 3 - Technology and elements used for automation of testing

In Table 3, we define various automation procedures that were executed during
the experiments.

2.3 Data processing and analysis
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We loaded the Process Monitor’s data in a clean Windows 10 Virtual Machine, and
then re-exported it with complete stack traces and Windows debugging symbols to
XML format.
We processed the exported Process Monitor’s event data using a Python script to extract
each stack trace, and examined each call frame in order to identify the first call to a
Windows system file. A sample contingency table is provided in Table 4. The calling
address, the resolved called symbol, the Dynamic Link Library (DLL) path and
metadata were extracted. The extracted API data consisting of 36 million Windows API
calls across all 30 experimental tests were further summarized into two-way
contingency tables plotting Windows API Call frequencies for each API Call and
experimental test combination.
System/API Call

CTBLocker_A.csv

Revenge_A.csv

…

Explorer
Session

Install
MS
Office

CloseHandle
CoCreateInstance
CoInitialize
CoInitializeSecurity
…
(Total of 1262 Calls)

4
70
44
38
…

10946
48
0
0
…

…
…
…
…
…

944
4567
289
116
…

0
0
542
0
…

Run
Powerpoint
+ User
Activity
1545
0
0
0
…

Table 4 - Sample contingency table comprising 1262 rows and 25 columns

Baseline
operations

Ransomware
tests

Experimental test

File Hash (SHA 256)

Baseline Boot to Idle

NOT RECORDED

Windows Explorer Session
Navigating OS and Folders
Install MS Office 07

NOT RECORDED

Install Kodi Media Centre

NOT RECORDED

Installing Firefox Browser

NOT RECORDED

Installing Apache Open
Office
Installing Logitech Media
Centre
Running Word

NOT RECORDED

Running PowerPoint

NOT RECORDED

Running Excel

NOT RECORDED

Running Apache Open Office

NOT RECORDED

Internet Browsing in IE

NOT RECORDED

Running Firefox Browser

NOT RECORDED

Run Kodi Media Centre

NOT RECORDED

Run Logitech Media Centre
Control

NOT RECORDED

CTB-Locker

128a0f0cd5d10f864d5a0741ba25996b2bf74f580ac7918
dec6516215801e39a

NOT RECORDED

NOT RECORDED
NOT RECORDED
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Experimental test

File Hash (SHA 256)

Cerber

cf262a9236eaf5230c219845823f36fd8c8e8b77ba882c34
ce38a5087539cf71
b2bcfc4c5d1d60f7ea4298d32dcfff303f4db4b1ba89a8b6
d24b7ccfe883e45a
a1e4693db6419eb5588f25d2b9f90db6c0e96e30a51fed5
f0236cbdd49894e75
a9a232cbff2c4347c1fcdeb1a3f1a6e45fbd4e93a107c6dd5
7fb8994df9d3bce
d56fb2bdad7a50ab1f6ef76c67669452ed4da2bf865beafc
f4956ab30bfa20fc
72ddceebe717992c1486a2d5a5e9e20ad331a98a146d29
76c943c983e088f66b
933af0c69e1e622e5677e52c24545761c2843b3f52ea38e
63bbe4786bfd6276e
824901dd0b1660f00c3406cb888118c8a10f66e3258b50
20f7ea289434618b13
c2e1770241fcc4b5c889fec68df024a6838e63e603f09371
5e3b468f9f31f67a
482711b2f17870ddae316619ba2f487641e35ac4c099ae
7e0ff4becd79e89faf (payload)
8ab65ceef6b8a5d2d0c0fb3ddbe1c1756b5c224bafc8065c
161424d63937721c
200bc25fa093ce65f41baa1c3efe02dcc238b04cb57a6fc5e
e87da1e04d6e168
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c
6e5babe8e080e41aa

CrypMIC
CryptFile2
CryptoMix
CryptoShield
GlobeImposter
Gryphon
JAFF
Mole
NemucodAES
Revenge
TeslaCrypt
WannaCry

Table 5 - Experimental tests - baseline and ransomware (hashes where applicable)

In Table 5 shows a list of all experiments, baseline and 14 ransomware strains, that
were conducted. Table 6 describes the baseline experiments that we executed. In
particular, we identify the system activities and/or events that were executed during
each Win/32 baseline operation.

Baseline operation

Experiment fully automated? [Yes/No]

Baseline boot to idle

Yes

Windows Explorer
session navigating
operating system and
folders

No
(opened one folder every 30 seconds,
copied folder from network share to
desktop, created folder ever minute,
moved files from desktop to created
folders, deleted a folder every 2 minutes)
Yes

Install MS Office 07
Install Kodi media
centre
Installing Firefox
browser

Yes
Yes
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Description of system events,
activities
Standard windows housekeeping,
connection to network shares, basic
operations
Common user activity. Opening
directories and locations, listing files,
querying file types to identify
associated applications
Writes many files, registers
components and COM objects
Non-Microsoft application handles
many media file types
Non-Microsoft application handles
internet and registers application
capable of using Internet.
Imports/reads data from other
browsers

Baseline operation

Experiment fully automated? [Yes/No]

Installing Apache open
office

No

Installing Logitech
media centre
Running word

No

Running PowerPoint

Running Excel

Running Apache open
office

Internet browsing in
IE
Running Firefox
browser
Run Kodi media centre

Run Logitech media
centre control

No
(Launch automated by script – Activity
manual: opened one document every 2
minutes, copy and pasted text every 30
seconds, typed for 1 minutes, imported
media, ran spell check and saved
document)
No
(Launch automated by script – Activity
manual: opened one document every 2
minutes, copied and pasted text every 30
seconds, typed for 1 minute, imported
media, ran spellcheck and saved
document)
No
(Launch automated by script – activity
manual: opened one document every 2
minutes, created sheet created 100 rows
of data, created chart)
No
(Initial launch automated by script –
activity manual: rotated through test
sequences for Word, PowerPoint and
Excel until time expired)
No
(Launch automated by script – activity
manual: browsed to a list of pages, one
page every 30 seconds)
No
(Launch automated by script – activity
manual: browsed to a list of pages, one
page every 30 seconds)
No
(Launch automated by script – allowed to
complete normal start up media scans –
further manual activity: browse a media
folder every minute, play one video file,
added a new media folder and scanned
for content)
No
(Required admin privileges and launch
from control panels. Added a new media
folder and scanned for content.

Table 6 – Baseline operations and description of system events and activities

3. Analysis
8

Description of system events,
activities
Alternate to Microsoft Office examine
the difference in coding standards for
similar activities
Media server. registers and starts
services and network listeners
Common user activity

Common user activity

Common user activity

Common user activity provides
alternate to Microsoft office
application. Examine the effect of
different coding standards on similar
activities to Running Microsoft Office
Products
Common user activity uses network

Common user activity uses network.
Alternate coding standards for similar
activities as Internet Browsing in IE
3rd party developed, accesses many
files, catalogues media, connects to the
internet to identify media. Scans
specified file system locations for
media files
Launches control panel, allows users to
identify media folders and execute file
system scans of specified locations for
media files. Starts and stops the media
centre service

Of the 1262 calls to external functions across all experiments, 244 were present in
ransomware which were further reduced to 209 calls by combining similar calls of
ANSI and Unicode variants as shown in Table 7.
Calls

Grouped into

CopyFileA
CopyFileExW
CopyFileW
CreateDirectoryA
CreateDirectoryW
…A
…W
…Ex
…ExA
…ExW

CopyFile [A|ExW|W]
CreateDirectory [A|W]
…[A|W|Ex|ExA|ExW]

Table 7 - Merging of similar API Calls

The rationale for merging similar API calls is that Windows API calls such as
FindNextFileW and FindNextFileA are essentially the same API call (the ‘W’ variant
accepting Unicode and ‘A’ variant accepting ANSI coded input strings). Similarly,
functions with Ex suffixes are generally newer with a different call pattern, however
their base functionality is often quite similar.
The API calls were arranged into two-way contingency tables that plotted the observed
frequency of each API call for each experimental test. We identified API calls of
interest. Calls of interest were selected where the “API call’s presence indicated
ransomware regardless of call frequency” and “API calls with significantly higherthan-average call frequencies” statistics. We used Fisher exact tests to compare the
prevalence of each specific API call in the ransomware group to the normal baseline
operations group. Calls with usage patterns that differed significantly (p < 0.05)
between the two groups were identified.

3.1 Results
An initial examination of the contingency table that compares all ransomware system
calls to system calls made by non-malicious normal baseline operations show that
ransomware used a small subset of all system calls logged during normal baseline
operations. Comparing the frequency of all ransomware system calls to the frequency
of system-calls in normal baseline operations shows that identification of ransomware
can be done through call frequencies alone (chi-square; p << 0.01; 95% confidence
level for significance testing). This is a reasonable expectation given the large data set
and high variability in call frequencies and prevalence. The API calls which contributed
most to the chi-square statistic were examined to determine what subset of calls could
be used to indicate the presence of ransomware activity.
When we examine individual API calls more closely, we found that 18 Windows API
calls where usage patterns (prevalence or call frequency) varied between ransomware
and baseline normal operation differed significantly (Tables 8, 9 and 10). These API
calls occur in significantly more ransomware strains (compared to baseline
experiments), or at greater call frequencies (p < 0.05).
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The interesting calls identified included:



Used in
more
ransomware
strains

Present only in
ransomware



8 API calls that existed only in ransomware at a significant level.
4 API calls that existed in both ransomware and normal operations, where the
difference in utilization of the API call was statistically significant and more
common in ransomware samples than in normal baseline operations.
6 API calls that existed in both ransomware and baseline normal operation and
where the ransomware frequency count exceeded the baseline mean by more
than three standard deviations (3σ).
Windows API Call

Count of
ransomware
samples
used

Count of
baseline
samples
used

InternetOpen

6

0

Usage differs
between
ransomware
and baseline
(Fisher exact
P-value)
0.006

CryptDeriveKey

5

0

0.017

CryptDecodeObject

4

0

0.042

CryptGenKey

4

0

0.042

CryptImportPublicKeyInfo

4

0

0.042

GetUserName

4

0

0.042

NdrClientCall2

4

0

0.042

socket

4

0

0.042

_tailMerge_CRYPTSP_dll*

9

1

0.002

CoCreateInstance

8

1

0.005

SHWindowsPolicy

8

1

0.005

GetFileType

10

4

0.027

Used in
ransomware at
higher call
frequency

Table 8 - Calls to Windows APIs (without considering call frequency) - ransomware vs normal baseline
operations

Count of
baseline
samples using
̅ + 𝟑𝝈)
high (𝒙
frequency call
rates

Significance
(Fisher exact)

Windows API Call

Count of
ransomware
samples using
̅ + 𝟑𝝈)
high (𝒙
frequency
calls rates

CryptAcquireContext

7

0

0.002

CloseHandle

6

0

0.006

FindNextFile

6

0

0.006

SetFilePointer

6

1

0.035

GetFileSize

4

0

0.042

SetFileAttributes

4

0

0.042

Table 9 - Calls to Windows APIs where ransomware call frequency exceeds baseline mean call frequency by
more than 3 standard deviations.
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Detected by call presence
(exclusive to ransomware)

CryptDecodeObject

Detected by call presence
(not ransomware
exclusive)

CryptGenKey

*
*
*

*
*

*

socket

*

*

*

*

_tailMerge_CRYPTSP_
dll

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

NemucodAES

*

*

*

WannaCry

*

*

NdrClientCall2

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

(1 false positive)

CoCreateInstance

*

*

(1 false positive)

SHWindowsPolicy

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

(4 false positivies)

GetFileType

*

(1 false positive)

CryptAcquireContext
Detected in ransomware through
statistically high (x ̅+3σ) call
frequencies

*

*

*

CryptImportPublicKe
yInfo
GetUserName

*

TeslaCrypt

*

Revenge

*

Mole

*

JAFF

CryptDeriveKey

Gryphon

CryptoShield

*

GlobeImposter

CryptoMix

*

CrypMIC

*

Cerber

InternetOpen

CTB-Locker

CryptFile2

Windows System
Call

CloseHandle

*

FindNextFile

*

SetFilePointer

*

*

*

*

*
*

*

*
*

(1 false positive)

GetFileSize

*

SetFileAttributes
Count of calls capable
of identifying
ransomware
* - Ransomware
Detected with System
Call

*

*
2

9

*

*

*
5

7

11

11

15

7

12

8

*

*

7

16

0

1

3

Table 10 - Calls to Windows APIs categorized by ransomware strain.

The fisher-exact test of independence showed a very high level of certainty that
the baseline versus ransomware samples differed through a systematic process,
namely, that the presence of ransomware in the system and not in our baseline
tests was not merely coincidental. For example, GetFileType is used more often in
ransomware than in baseline samples runs (10 ransomware samples vs 4 baseline
operations). However, due to the small sample sizes for both baseline and
ransomware, the difference in the API usage by ransomware strains and the
baseline tests within the significant range (p=0.066 > 0.05). As such, no specific
API can be used for detecting ransomware. Rather, the APIs identified and
reported in Table 10 can aid in the detection of ransomware strains that would
otherwise remain undetected in a Win/32 standard operating environment. It
must also be noted that none of these APIs are dangerous for a standard Win/32
operating environment. However, based on our findings, we found that calls to
some of these APIs are more frequent than others during a ransomware infection.

4. Discussion
Ransomware activities were clearly identified in thirteen out of fourteen ransomware
strains using Windows API calls of interest. Of these, nine were identified calls that
were unique to ransomware and did not trigger false positive events during detection.
Only the variant of TeslaCrypt tested was not identified.
One third of the API calls of interest were related to cryptographic activities. These
calls were primarily used to obtain handles to key containers [12] and generate public
and private keys. The presence of cryptographic API calls is reasonable and expected
for typical ransomware activities. A delayed load tailMerge of CRYPTSP.DLL [13]
was also present in nine strains of ransomware. This cryptographic service provider
dynamic link library appears to be a legacy crypto library the use of which has been
identified and discussed in [14].
A further six of the API calls were related to filesystem operations. These included calls
to scan directory structures for files, examine file types, sizes and set pointers to allow
the ransomware to read and write file contents. Five out of six file operations were
detected through API call frequency analysis indicating that while non-malicious
activities also resulted in file activity, the rates observed in ransomware significantly
exceeded (x ̅+3σ) the call rates during normal system operations.
Internet and socket connections were surprisingly absent from normal non-malicious
operations. It appears that the coding patterns employed by windows and open-source
software developers do not often create direct network sockets or connections. Socket
operations tend to be low-level in nature, which means coding complete network
protocols using sockets is likely to be a laborious task. Socket programming is useful
for limited and specific tasks that require lightweight network listeners or clients with
well-defined communications protocols [15][16].
Four ransomware strains utilized NdrClientCall2 which is associated with the Windows
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interface. RPC is used to create client server applications
without the need to manage the underlying network protocols and communications [17].
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For example, RPC could allow ransomware developers to establish command and
control server communication without resorting to socket level programming.
CoCreateInstance was used non-exclusively in eight out of the fourteen ransomware
strains. CoCreateInstance appears to be used by ransomware to access Windows COM
objects through unique class and instance identifiers. Developers may use
CoCreateInstance to obtain access to a COM handler instance that can perform a wide
range of windows actions including creating file links, spawning shells and scheduling
start-up items. While this is a perfectly legitimate programming technique, it appears
to be rare among legitimate baseline samples. It has also been observed in ransomware
examples to obfuscate code being executed and provide a mechanism to bypass
Microsoft’s Antimalware Scan Interface [18][19].

5. Conclusion
In this work, we have successfully identified Windows API calls that differ
significantly in their usage between normal non-malicious operations and ransomware
activities. These low-level system calls may be useful in identifying ransomware
without specifically identifying code signatures within the ransomware executable. The
goal of this research was to investigate API calls that could allude toward
ransomware infection. Based on the findings reported in this paper, we can have
a now better understanding of what the ransomware strain is actually doing on
the system in terms of API calls. Our research results obtained in this work will
help in the future development of better anti-virus software, additional security
controls including Intrusion Detection System (IDS), or even in hardening kernels
by allowing them to detect multiple API calls.

Given the nature of many of the identified Windows API calls, detection of ransomware
activity may be possible at the operating system level. Our research found several API
calls of interest that were predominantly present in ransomware. By further combining
the detection of these API calls it would be possible to further reduce the false positive
rate and increase the detection rate.
As the Windows APIs that have been discussed operate as low-level calls of the
operating system, we expect that circumventing detection by using different APIs will
be a complex process requiring developers to statically link complex file system and
network code into their malware binaries. This type of code embedding would greatly
increase the size of malicious executable and would funnel API calls to even lower
levels. We believe this approach is unlikely to be successful for ransomware developers
because the execution of code that directly calls low level drivers and file system APIs
is uncommon and would lead to easy detection.
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